How, and by what means, is peace constituted? In the first two decades of the twentieth century, a leading pacifist, Alfred H. Fried, set this fundamental question at the heart of the pacifist programme. Causal pacifism was the key term: "If we wish to eliminate an effect, we must first remove its cause. And if we wish to set a new and desirable effect in its place, we must substitute the cause with another which is capable of creating the desired effect" (Fried 1918, 10). This sounds abstract in terms of its methodology, but was posed as something quite specific: If war is the outcome of international anarchy, which still prevails in relations between states, this anarchy itself must be abolished in order to remove its effect, which is war. Moreover, in place of anarchy, a ‚social order' must be established whose effect is to allow conflicts in general to be managed in a non-violent reliable manner. In other words -in the political sense of the term -peace is created.
to the abolition of conflict but to what, in current terminology, is known as conflict transformation: "the reshaping of international relations in a way which will imbue conflicts with a character which frees them from violence and makes them entirely suitable for management by legal means" (Fried 1918, 12) . This conflict transformation -‚transforming the nature of conflict' -is precisely what is meant by ‚civilising conflict' in the current peace theory debate (Senghaas 1994b; Vogt 1996) . In the classical doctrine of causal pacifism, the civilised management of conflicts within states (internal conflicts) was assumed to have been achieved to a greater or lesser extent -successful ‚sociation' having already taken place -but this premise can no longer be taken as given today. For a glance around the world reveals that at present: there are virtually no wars any more between states although the international community is still far from being a society of states. Instead, there are numerous military intrastate conflicts, primarily civil wars in many different forms (Gantzel & Schwinghammer 1995) . Thus facilitating internal peace -and not only the new world order -once again becomes a key analytical and practical focus for constructive peace analysis.
Social and political transformation in the 20th Century
When researching the causes of peace and the conditions for internal peace, it is necessary to consider the radical changes which took place first in Western countries but, in recent decades more strikingly in non-Western countries. When the concept of causal pacifism was formulated at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the world -especially the majority of today's industrialised countries -was still largely agricultural in organisation. Although little has been written about this subject, the last hundred years will go down in history as the century of the worldwide erosion of the traditional peasant economy (‚depeasantisation'). Today, most people no longer live in subsistence economies but in entirely commercialised or market economies with an increasingly globalised frame of reference. The developing countries are no exception to this economic transition despite obvious differences exemplified by countries in East Asia and Central Africa.
In contrast to agricultural communities in a traditional rural framework, this new socioeconomic environment has greatly expanded people's horizons and scope for action. The urbanisation associated with structural change also intensifies communications and -for the first time in history -allows people to organise themselves politically on a broad basis. At the same time, mass literacy has resulted in a broad-based and highly effective mobilisation of intelligence: in other words, it has lead to intellectual emancipation and a skills revolution. People's level of competence has been rising dramatically. Thus, a conversion is taking place: "from ignorance to self-consciousness, to an interconnectedness with the world", as a nun working with the underclasses of Indian society aptly described it some time ago (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 6, 1999) . In contrast to traditional societies, this opens up opportunities for upward mobility. Moreover, the globalised media allows expectations and lifestyles to be both globally compared and illustrated. Indeed, the globalisation of such possibilities or demonstration effects in a graphic way may well have a greater political impact nowadays than the mere globalisation of the economies.
Thus traditional societies are evolving into politicisable and, in reality, politicised societies, where traditional identities are challenged and questioned. ‚Truths' can no longer be defined in absolute terms. Diverging notions of justice, and interests, proliferate. Given the plurality of projects to reshape and redefine the political order, the question of what constitutes a ‚good society' becomes a fundamental problem. The tranquillitas ordinis, the ‚tranquillity of the social order' -once the subject of writings by St Augustine and many non-European authors in traditional societies -can no longer be pinpointed. What emerge are modern forms of society which, in terms of their structure, are rife with the potential for conflict and even violence and which -unless they are restrained by dictatorship or despotism -can no longer be reduced to a common denominator. Yet under these new socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions, even dictatorship and despotism are doomed to failure in both the short or long term: for socio-cultural, socio-economic and, consequently, political plurality is unassailable, and the politicisation of identities, truths, notions of justice and interests is irreversible because it emerges from the very basis of socially mobile societies. Moreover, what results from all of this is the demand -presently heard in every corner of the world -for political participation.
Fundamental politicisation has occurred, when social, economic and cultural conflicts present themselves as political conflicts, and when political conflicts present themselves as social, economic and cultural conflicts. The key issue, which then arises in an acute form in many societies today, is coexistence despite fundamental politicisation (Senghaas 1998; 2001) . The dubious alternative to peaceful coexistence -in an extreme case -is civil war, as political events around the globe demonstrate each and every day.
Conditions for the peaceful regulation of conflict
But how can civil war be avoided in this situation? This transformation of the world in which we live was initially the outcome of the agrarian and industrial revolutions from the mideighteenth century and especially in the nineteenth century in Western Europe. This, then, was where the issue outlined here -i.e. coexistence despite fundamental politicisation -first became acute; as a result, some of the conclusions drawn from the experience and debate about these issues are most readily available in Western Europe (Senghaas 1994b) .
What then are the essential conditions for the civilised -i.e. the non-violent -resolution of unavoidable conflict? In the light of the European experience six cornerstones can be identified:
The first is a legitimate monopoly of force by the state, i.e. safeguarding the community based on the rule of law, which is of paramount importance for any modern peace-order. Disarming citizens is the only way to force them to conduct their conflicts over identity and interests through argument rather than violence. Only when these conditions are in place can potential conflict parties be compelled to deal with their conflicts through argument and thus through deliberative politics in the public arena. The crucial importance of this condition becomes apparent wherever the monopoly of force breaks down and citizens re-arm again, with the re-emergence of feuds and warlordspresently a common feature of military conflicts all over the world.
Secondly, such a monopoly of force also creates a need for control under the rule of law that can only be guaranteed by, and indeed, epitomises, the modern constitutional state. Without this control, the monopoly of force is simply a euphemistic way of describing the arbitrary behaviour of dictatorial rule. The rule of law provides ‚the rules of the game' for the shaping of opinion and the political will, as well as for the decision-making process and the enforcement of law. Alongside the general principles that are set forth in catalogues of basic rights, these rules of the game are essential, precisely because in politicised societies serious disagreements on substantive issues prevail.
The third major condition for internal peace is affect control, which arises from the range and wealth of many inter-dependences characterising modern societies. Such societies are highly ramified, and people within them play out a variety of roles that reflect their wide span of loyalties. Conflict theory and real-life experience show that highly diverse social roles lead to a fragmentation of conflict and thus to the moderation of conflict behaviour and affect control: Without affect control, in complex environments such as modernising and modern societies, peaceful social relations would be inconceivable.
On the other hand, fourth, democratic participation is essential, precisely due to the indispensability of affect control. ‚Legal unrest' -Rechtsunruhe in the term of Sigmund Freud -will result from situations where people are unable to become involved in public affairs, either for ethnic or other forms of discrimination, and at worst a conflict will escalate and, in politicised societies, can become a hotbed of violence. So democracy, as the basis for legal development, is not a luxury but a necessary precondition for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Fifth, however, in politicised societies, this approach to conflict management will only have permanence if there are continual efforts to ensure social justice. The great majority of modern capitalist societies are run on market lines, and social inequality is ever present. Unless efforts are continually made to counter this dynamic of inequality, such societies will develop deep social fissures. Therefore if the credibility of the constitutional state is not to be called into question by disadvantaged individuals or groups, on the grounds that the rules of the game are no longer fair, there must be an ongoing effort to ensure distributive justice. By contrast, genuine efforts to achieve social justice and fairness give substance to constructive conflict management, and also provide legitimacy to public institutions.
If there are fair opportunities in the public arena to articulate identities and achieve a balance between diverse interests, it may be assumed that this approach to conflict management has been reliably internalized and that conflict management competence based on compromise -including the necessary tolerance -has thus become an integral element of political action. The legitimate monopoly of force, the rule of law and democracy -in short, the modern democratic constitutional state -become anchored in political culture. The culture of constructive conflict management thus becomes the emotional basis of the community. Material measures (‚social justice') emerge as an important bridge between the institutional structure and its positive resonance in people's emotions (‚public sentiment'). What develops finally -to use Ralf Dahrendorf's phrase -are "ligatures", in other words, deeply rooted political and cultural bonds and socio-cultural allegiances.
The reluctant development of a culture of constructive conflict management
The political culture of constructive conflict management does not mark the beginning of modern coexistence. On the contrary, it is a latecomer to the historical process. While similar to the other five cornerstones identified above, in the past it had no place in Europe's traditional -i.e. pre-modern -culture. On the contrary, the emergence of each individual cornerstone can be described far more accurately as a ‚reluctant process' or a process contre coeur (Senghaas 1998; 2001) : for historically, disarmament was invariably the outcome of defeat in warfare. The strong triumphed over the weak; the superior over the inferior. The rule of law originated in historically contentious compromises which were wrung out of the conflict parties and were naturally unpopular, yet -in fragile power relationships -were viewed first and foremost as temporary concessions. As far as affect control was concerned, self-determined life in clearly defined micro-contexts was always viewed as preferable to integration into self-referential functional systems with their own dynamics. After Sigmund Freud, at the latest, it has been recognised that affect control is governed by the imperatives of the reality principle and not the pleasure principle: in other words, it cannot be achieved without a substantial measure of affective sublimation.
The struggle for greater participation, too, always took place against entrenched opposition. In a world where inequality is endemic, the same applies to the struggle for fairness and distributive justice: Political participation and fair distribution had to be forced out of the power holders in every case. Finally, a culture of constructive conflict management could only be established under a fortunate combination of circumstances, i.e. when each cornerstone of civility, defined above, became a historic and mutually reinforcing reality which was finally anchored in people's emotions. Only under these extremely favourable conditions were the civilisation of conflict and thus the fundamental principle of non-violent conflict management likely to take root in an environment dominated by fundamental politicisation.
The process itself must therefore be viewed as the historical outcome of many conflicts that, in the European context, took place progressively as described above. What emerges is a model of conflict management, to be labelled the civilisational hexagon (Senghaas 1994b; Calließ 1997) that has constitutional, institutional and material dimensions but is also characterised by specific mentalities and, in sum -and this must be underlined -represents an artificial product of the civilising process:
It can be plausibly argued that the conditions which characterise fundamental politicisation in emancipated mass societies, such as absolutist claims, the fixation on particular interests, the emphasis on specific identity, possessive individualism and lobbyist pressure are in some ways ‚natural', whereas tolerance, an awareness of the rules of the game, moderation, the separation of powers, the willingness to compromise, and a sensitivity to more than just one's own interests tend to be ‚artificial', i.e. the outcome of laborious collective learning processes. Especially in Europe, all these broad-based civilisational achievements, were hard-won in the face of -and in conflict with -the old indigenous European estates-dominated social traditions and, indeed, the modern class society which emerged in the nineteenth century. Thus today's democratic constitutional state is not the result of cultural or genetic predisposition. Rather, it is the outcome of a series of innovations and, in two and a half millennia of European history, only manifested in its most recent development within the last 150 years (Senghaas 1998; 2001) . 
Alternative responses to social and political transformations
The lesson which Europe had to learn painfully and laboriously, by trial and error, by direct as well as circuitous or even erroneous routes -namely tolerance as a solution in the face of pluralisation which was initially perceived as a threat -will be repeated, in principle if not in detail, in other parts of the world. Here, too, with the proliferation of fundamental politicisation due to the transition from traditional to socially mobile societies, as described above, mastering the problems of coexistence is a task that can no longer be postponed. Yet as with traditional Europe, there are no viable responses to these modern problems within the conventional culture of traditional non-European communities. The self-perception of these communities was generally cosmocentric: in classical mythology in particular, the cosmos, society and the people within it were regarded as a single entity, forming a well-ordered, well-organised hierarchy whose architecture was static. Within this structure, the actors' roles were preordained. Historical self-perception was cyclical in nature, and hence not truly historical in the modern sense, for these cycles -like the rhythms of nature throughout the year or political life (the rise, flowering and fall of imperial structures or empires) -constantly came back to the same starting point. In general, the notion of a plurality of truths was inconceivable since there was only ‚The One Truth'.
If under these premises, the institutions of community and government in particular are seen as an organic unit, conflicts will be viewed as dysfunctional. As in ancient China and elsewhere, conflicts were regarded as ‚the great disorder under Heaven' and hence the onset of existing or impending chaos (luan). Counteractive thinking was then seen as a contribution to overcoming this chaos, i.e. as a chaos management strategy whose purpose is to restore ‚cosmic order'. These notions are no longer helpful as a strategy to resolve modern problems of coexistence. For this reason, and due to force of circumstance in the rest of the world as well, new perspectives on conflict management and therefore new approaches and forms of internal peace must develop which are appropriate for the modern era (Senghaas 1998; 2001) .
Unlike development in the West, the collective learning processes in the non-European world are not only determined by the radical social and cultural changes taking place locally. They are also shaped by the developments under way in the West. In this context, four distinct responses can be observed in the non-European world:
The first is a modernistic, imitative response, which accepts the West's challenge as well as its experiences and ‚solutions'. The West is regarded as a model in the struggles against what is considered to be the burden of one's own tradition -including one's own traditional culture. In the first half of the twentieth century, such responses could be observed in many places, including China, but they failed to stand the test of time. Today, however, these responses are proving highly successful in two of the four East Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs), namely Korea and Taiwan. These young industrial countries are evolving into ‚newly democratising countries', whose political culture -despite its entire local colour -will not differ fundamentally from those of Western countries in the foreseeable future. When the upheavals of modernisation take place and the problems of coexistence become acute, the guardians of tradition appear in various guises: as traditionalists, as reactionaries, but in general as conservatives. They seek to turn back the tide of history and, in particular, to stop the onward march of modernisation.
This second type of reaction can be observed all over the world, wherever Western modernism collides with traditional ways of living. Gandhi could be cited as an example in this context, for his philosophy of life was rural, anti-commercial and egalitarian. It favoured small units and consensus-based direct democracy within a manageable framework. Today, similar concepts can still be found in Central Africa in particular. Third, wherever such upheavals occur, semi-modernists can be observed. They are enthusiastic about Western know-how, but seek to shield their society from all other intellectual influences. Japan has successfully pursued this course since the middle of the last century, whereas really existing socialism was unsuccessful. More recently, the ‚Singapore School' has become a preeminent example of semi-modernism. Another example is Islamic Fundamentalism. However, the political problems of an increasingly complex and pluralising society -whether in Singapore, China, in many Islamic societies, or elsewhere -cannot be resolved, or brought closer to a solution with this type of prescriptive programme of governance, least of all in those places where there is a reliance on theocratic approaches which are rooted in Islamic Fundamentalism. These latter endeavours (as presently in Iran) have fascinating historical parallels, but also demonstrate the futility of the ‚theocratic counter-revolution' against modernism, which could also be observed in Europe -and especially in France itself -during the first half of the nineteenth century in reaction to the French Revolution. In such a theocratic programme, pluralism was -and is -regarded as an immoral concept which in practice destroys the fabric of society, breaks down traditional values and culture, and represents the epitome of moral blindness (jahiliyya). On the other hand they regarded as entirely appropriate for the modern day the untrammelled religiously-motivated exercise of power.
Ultimately, however, whenever modernism and traditions collide and social upheavals occur in the non-European world, innovations will be required. As with Europe, these changes in the non-European regions cannot be predicted with certainty. Nonetheless, Europe's experience is likely to be repeated in some places: As soon as traditional culture is confronted with modernising tendencies and societies undergo a structural and therefore also a mental shift, these cultures -with bitter inevitability -come into conflict with themselves. This triggers the necessary collective learning processes -and may also prompt problematic and undesirable developments.
According to the theory of The End of History (Fukuyama 1922) , all innovations of modernism have already been realised exhaustively in the Western/European countries and nonEuropean countries have nothing more to offer in terms of dealing with the problems of coexistence. Contrary to this theory, however, four-fifths of humanity again in the coming decades will be compelled, generally against their will, to experiment with finding locally appropriate solutions to the problems of social mobility and fundamental politicisation. The solutions that ultimately prove their worth are unlikely to be invented as abstract concepts on the drawing board. What is more likely in this context is a repetition of the European experience: the arrangements for coexistence and sustainable conflict management -in other words, internal peace -which ultimately prove viable on a long-term basis will have developed as the unintended outcome of political conflicts.
Thus the non-European states will not be spared a fate similar to Europe's laborious, painful and conflict-ridden journey towards the democratic constitutional state, its institutions and ethos. The process will be similar to the European experience, although its outcome may be different, especially if genuine innovations are actually to take place. However, in this latter case, in particular, the outcome would not reflect the profound dimensions of conventional culture, but new aspectsagainst its own traditions.
Viewed on a global level, one of the great challenges for humanity in the twenty-first century is to find the solution to pluralisation in patterns of tolerance -a tolerance that is safeguarded at the institutional level and anchored in people's emotions. This challenge is no less weighty an issue than the burgeoning environmental problems world-wide. A glance back to the twentieth century demonstrates the urgency of this problem. During that century, many ‚alternatives' to tolerance were tested in barbaric and brutal ways: exclusion, ghettoisation, apartheid, expulsion, ethnic cleansing or genocide, and civil wars in many different forms (Heinsohn 1998; Dabag and Platt 1998) . In contrast to causal pacifism at the beginning of the twentieth century, the irreversible nature of pluralisation therefore means that the quest for a legal, institutional, material and psychological system of coexistence within societies remains at the top of the agenda. The need to reach internal peace is therefore not a peripheral problem; today more than ever, it is an acute, life-threatening and global problem. In every corner of the world, acceptance of traditional and conventional structures is declining; as a result, conflicts of interests and orientation, power struggles and cultural clashes, motivated by the search for new social and political structures, are unavoidable.
Building an international culture of constructive conflict management
What is a difficult task even within individual societies, and what, even under the best of conditions, can only be considered a fragile achievement with no guarantee of permanency -the shaky stability of internal peace -seems all the more difficult at the international level, namely achieving and safeguarding international coexistence (Falk 1995; Ferencz 1994) . States have still not disarmed, despite the fact that under international law, a fundamental ban on the use of force has existed in the United Nations (UN) Charter since 1945: The UN Security Council has in principle a ‚monopoly of force' based on the UN system of collective security, though it must be conceded that it is problematic. The question of what might be implied by ‚control through the rule of law at the international level' has only begun to be discussed in recent years (Bauer 1996; Gading 1996; Lailach 1998) . Who, for example, is actually authorised at the international level to exercise control over the Security Council, the body entrusted under the United Nations Charter with this quasi monopoly of force? Where is the authority responsible for dealing with complaints against Security Council decisions, when such decisions are considered by those affected to constitute a breach of international law? (Bedjaoui 1995; Falk 1993; Höffe 1999; Martenczuk 1996; Zürn and Zangl 1999) .
Furthermore, it is true that striking processes of internationalisation, transnationalisation or -as it has become fashionable to term it -globalisation are under way (Beisheim et al. 1999 ). However, these processes are taking place in what is still a deeply divided world that generates very few system-related (and globally effective) constraints on affect control (Senghaas 1994a) . Only in technical/functional areas, such as international air transport, do universally accepted rules exist. Imagine if there were comparable rules for the transactions of international finance, whose function would be to domesticate the psychology of the stock markets! What might democratic participation at global level entail? Who -apart from the states, which do this already -would have to organise themselves at international level, and how would they have to do it, in order to satisfy the democratic imperative and avert violent conflict? Would interest groups be represented alongside governments -such as employers' and employees' associations, alongside the states, in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) -or, indeed, professional associations, cultural and religious communities of every kind and size, and multinational companies? And what about the often-quoted ‚civil society' -the many non-government organisations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International? But what are the bases of their mandate? Indeed, what form would a representative democratic constitution take at international level? What would ‚participation by citizens' mean in this context? (Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1995; Höffe 1999) . Question after question arises, to which -in view of the gradually emerging "postnational constellation" (Habermas 1998; Zürn 1998 ) -a solution must be found in the twenty-first century.
In other respects, it can be assumed that at the international level, too, the chances of civilising conflict remain slim if no efforts are made to eliminate inequalities and at least to work towards fair distribution. Only if serious and purposeful efforts are undertaken will it be possible to prevent the kind of build-up of ultimately uncontrollable explosive political force generated by the dynamics of privilege and discrimination (Brieskorn 1997) . Only then -underpinned in substantive terms -will a culture of constructive conflict management have a chance at the international level (Bobbio 1998 ).
Peace policy
If we examine the experiences with internal peace and the requirements for international peace and an appropriate order, it can be stated with regard to dependable and civilised management of conflict or lasting peace (Senghaas D. and Senghaas E. 1996 ) that peace, defined as the lasting and sustainable civilising of conflict, must be viewed as a non-violent political process geared to preventing the use of force. Through this process, agreements and compromises must be used to create conditions which enable peaceful relations to be established between social groups or between states and nations, without jeopardising their existence, and without violating the perceptions of justice or interests of individuals and groups so seriously that, after exhausting all peaceful remedies, they deem it necessary to resort to violence. Shaped in this way, peace policy can then be understood as an indispensable, continuous and constructive handling of political virulence which, in the modern world, results from fundamental politicisation.
A global system for peace
If peace policy is to be successful, even in a smaller arena, i.e. within societies and states, the conditions must be favourable; indeed, adverse conditions often lead to situations in which nonviolent conflict resolution gives way to violence. Nevertheless, as the earlier questions imply, the necessary prerequisites at the global level with regard to the creation of a new world order are even broader in scope since conditions here are far less conducive (Rittberger 1994) .
The pacifists of the early twentieth century, who endeavoured to formulate constructive concepts of peace, thought in international terms; they genuinely aimed to achieve a world peaceorder. Nowadays, we would call it ‚global governance', reflecting the many old and, indeed, very new global interdependences. Nevertheless, they were realistic enough to realise that such an order needs regional or continental building blocks in order to be truly functional.
At the regional level, too, political community-building is a difficult collective learning process. This is borne out, in particular, by the experiences with European integration. This integration process requires certain shared basic values, enhanced communications, fair exchange which benefits all parties and above all a responsiveness to the needs and concerns of weaker participants in the integration process. However, such a process of integration at the regional level must be successful, even if only in the European context at first, because this alone will provide proof that a lasting peace-order beyond the national-state is not an illusion, but can be "constituted" (gestiftet), to use Kant's term, on reliable foundations with the prospect of permanence through constitutional, institutional, material and emotional endeavours (Deutsch et al. 1957; Zielinski 1995; Senghaas 1992 ).
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In the efforts to establish global governance, the aim -as clearly identified by the proponents of causal pacifism -is to create an architecture and inner life for a world peace-order: from the lower level, of the peaceful individual state (what a prerequisite!), via its integration into loose or broad-based integrated regional organisations, up to the highest level where international organisations and international rules (international regimes) create sustainable institutional and legally constituted framework conditions for the civilised resolution of unavoidable conflicts. The task is to work against violent conflict at all levels, and, indeed, overcome it in principle. This was once the idea of visionaries; today, this must become a key element of pragmatic realpolitik.
Activities to promote a global system of peace
Who can be expected to initiate this realpolitik aimed at the creation of global governance? Pacifists with constructive programmes once believed that a new world order would result from the prudent behaviour of leading statesmen; in other words, from clever diplomacy based on internationalist, cosmopolitan norms and with the backing of international organisations. They had no problems with the state per se, as they recognised the qualitative difference between states. Above all, they already understood the meaning of the term ‚rogue state' (Fried in Benz 1998, 73) . This denoted those actors in the international community who steadfastly refuse to accept the international order. Reflecting the prevailing attitudes and conditions of the day, this pacifist philosophy thus relied heavily on the state and state actors, although for the purposes of civilising the community of states, social movements such as civic, women's or socialist pacifist movements and their international networks were considered useful. Anarchist thought was entirely foreign to this brand of pacifism.
Admittedly, there are still states with different characters; it would be frivolous to downplay this fact, for it opens up opportunities for civilising conflict. However, the modern world's deeper and broader interdependencies mean that, at least in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the significance of state and statehood is decreasing. Such interdependencies allow not only economic and cultural actors but also social actors in particular to play a role in international politics (Czempiel 1993) .
Alongside the increasingly economic nature of foreign policy, which has been observed for some time, foreign relations today are also becoming ‚socialised'. This itself has an impact on foreign policy: The media, interest groups, parties, political foundations, professional associations, NGOs and other social groups are increasingly networked across national borders, with some of them having already acquired remarkable authority (Calließ 1998) .
Moreover, in the management of disasters and emergencies, but especially in responding to ethno-political conflicts, NGOs are absolutely essential in today's world. A new and diverse field of peace policy action is emerging for socially committed citizens, which makes a variety of demands in terms of staff presence and skills. Activities include assisting politically and socially disadvantaged groups (‚empowerment'), escorting persons in danger, support for refugees, postconflict peacebuilding, reporting on incipient conflicts and signs of escalation (‚early warning'), observing demonstrations, organising dialogue between hostile groups, mediation and process assistance, the provision of judicial observers, a physical presence in potential and real areas of tension, the provision of electoral observers, and advising official missions such as the UN, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and European Union (EU) (Merkel 1998).
In the longer term, these activities cannot be organised on an ad hoc basis; besides the necessary commitment, they require appropriate training. In other words, what is needed is a problem-and situation-specific ‚civilian peace service', or, indeed, a specialised peace service in which civil commitment can be matched by appropriate skills. This opens up another broad new area of activity for constructive pacifism, which also requires preparatory and accompanying research and assessment. However, this has only begun to develop since the 1990s.
The need to develop concepts for these peace activities increases with the demand for their services, which reflects real needs, and especially with initial experiences. These experiencesparticularly those gained in crisis and conflict situations -demonstrate the extent to which state and civil society actors rely on each other in many instances, even though they operate on different levels and have different target groups (Lederach 1994) . Even military security measures may prove indispensable on some occasions to ensure that in armed conflicts, for example, civil society actors are able to play a role at all. Dogmatic fears of inter-agency contact have proved to be counterproductive in this context, whereas shared learning processes -i.e. ‚multi-track activities' -have shown themselves to be the way forward (Ropers 1997) .
